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Abstract 
Quantum entanglement poses a challenge to the traditional metaphysical view that an 
extrinsic property of an object is determined by its intrinsic properties. So structural realists 
might be tempted to cite quantum entanglement as evidence for structural realism. I argue, 
however, that quantum entanglement undermines structural realism. If we classify two 
entangled electrons as a single system, we can say that their spin properties are intrinsic 
properties of the system, and that we can have knowledge about these intrinsic properties. 
Specifically, we can know that the parts of the system are entangled and spatially separated 
from each other. In addition, the concept of supervenience neither illuminates quantum 
entanglement nor helps structural realism.  
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This paper discusses the relationship between quantum entanglement and structural realism. 
Quantum entanglement is a peculiar phenomenon described by quantum mechanics. 
Structural realism is a popular view in philosophy of science these days. Does quantum 
entanglement support or undermine structural realism? It appears initially that quantum 
entanglement supports structural realism. This paper argues, however, that on close 
examination, quantum entanglement undermines structural realism. 
This present discussion on quantum entanglement and structural realism is organized as 
follows. In Section 2, I explicate three distinctions crucial to understanding what structural 
realism asserts: the distinction between an object and a property, the distinction between 
extrinsic and intrinsic properties, and the distinction between reduction and elimination. In 
Section 3, I expound structural realism, making use of the three distinctions. In Section 4, I 
elucidate what it is for two electrons to be entangled, and argue that under the view that the 
two particles form a single system, the entanglement undermines rather than supports 
structural realism. I also show that the concept of supervenience neither illuminates quantum 
entanglement nor helps structural realism. In sum, quantum entanglement cannot be cited as 
evidence for structural realism. 
 
2. Three Distinctions 
Traditional metaphysics distinguishes between an object and a property. An object is that 
which bears a property. The tennis ball bears the property of being spherical and the property 
of being similar to the baseball. As will become clear in the next section, however, ontic 
structural realism denies that an object is distinct from a property. 
The traditional metaphysics also distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic 
properties. David Lewis says, “We distinguish intrinsic properties, which things have in 
virtue of the way they themselves are, from extrinsic properties, which they have in virtue of 
their relations or lack of relations to other things” (Lewis, 1986, p. 61). For example, a tennis 
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ball has the intrinsic property of being spherical. The sphericity is a property that the tennis 
ball has by virtue of the way it is. Also, the tennis ball has the extrinsic property of being 
similar to a baseball with respect to shape. The similarity is a property the tennis has by virtue 
of the relation that it bears to the baseball. 
Intrinsic properties are ontologically prior to extrinsic properties, and extrinsic 
properties are derivative of intrinsic properties. For example, the sphericity of the tennis ball 
and the baseball is ontologically prior to the similarity between the two balls; the similarity 
derives from their sphericity. Imagine a world in which there is only the tennis ball: In this 
world, the tennis ball is spherical without being similar to anything else. Also, the similarity 
of the tennis ball and the baseball is reducible to the sphericity of each of the two balls, i.e., 
on close examination, the similarity is nothing but the sphericity of each of the two balls. 
There is no property called “similarity” over and above the sphericity. As we will see in the 
next section, however, structural realism denies the classical view of the relationship between 
an intrinsic property and an extrinsic property. 
Let me now turn to the distinction between reduction and elimination. We say, for 
example, that a peach is reducible to a collection of atoms. When we say so, what we mean is 
that on close examination, the peach turns out to be the collection of atoms. The peach and 
the collection are not separate objects but rather one and the same object. If God created the 
collection of atoms, he created the peach, and vice versa. To say that a peach is reducible to 
the collection of atoms does not mean that the peach does not exist. It only means that what 
we take to be the peach is nothing but the collection of atoms. So even if the peach is 
reducible to the collection of atoms, we can still eat a peach. 
In contrast, to eliminate an object from our ontology means that we once believed that 
it existed, but we no longer believe that it exists. For example, witches and phlogiston have 
been eliminated from our ontology. Paul Churchland (1981) is not a reductionist but rather an 
eliminativist about beliefs. He does not claim that a belief is reducible to a brain state. He 
rather claims that beliefs do not exist. The term “phlogiston” is embedded in the false theory, 
viz., the phlogiston theory, so phlogiston does not exist. Similarly, the term “belief” is 
embedded in the false theory, viz., folk psychology, so beliefs do not exist. We should 
eliminate beliefs from our ontology in the way we eliminated witches and phlogiston from 
our ontology. We will see in the next section that structural realists are eliminative about 
objects and intrinsic properties. 
 
3. Structural Realism 
There are diverse versions of structural realism. This paper concerns itself only with 
epistemic structural realism and ontic structural realism, as defined by James Ladyman 
(2014). According to epistemic structural realism, “we can believe what scientific theories 
tell us about the relations entered into by unobservable objects, and suspend judgment as to 
the nature of the latter” (Ladyman, 2014). In addition, most advocates of epistemic structural 
realism assert that “there must be individual objects and properties that are ontologically prior 
to relational structure” (Ladyman, 2014). Thus, epistemic structural realism consists of the 
metaphysical thesis that there are unobservable objects which have intrinsic and extrinsic 
properties, and the epistemological thesis that we can know about relational properties of 
unobservables objects, but not about their intrinsic properties. On this account, objects and 
their intrinsic properties exist, and they are distinct from their relational properties. Thus, they 
are neither reducible to relational properties nor eliminable from our ontology. By contrast, 
ontic structural realism holds “that there are no ‘things’ and that structure is all there is” 
(Ladyman, 2014). In other words, objects and intrinsic properties do not exist, and extrinsic 
properties are all that there is. Objects and intrinsic properties are not reducible to relational 
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properties. They should rather be eliminated from our ontology. Thus, they are in the same 
boat as witches and phlogiston. 
Roman Frigg and Ioannis Votsis (2011) observe that the foremost criticism against 
ontic structural realism is that it is impossible to have relations without relata. Ontic structural 
realism claims that all that exists are relations. Hence, it is committed to the view that there 
can be relations without relata. There is a debate over whether it makes sense to say that there 
can be relations without relata (Ladyman, 2014). Stathis Psillos (2001, 2006), Tian Cao 
(2003), Jacob Busch (2003), Matteo Morganti (2004) criticize the view, while Howard Stein 
(1989, p. 59), Simon Saunders (2003), and Ladyman and Don Ross (2007) defend the view. 
This paper does not explore this territory. It rather explores whether quantum entanglement 
supports or undermines structural realism. 
Before turning to quantum entanglement, however, I want to make a comment on a 
terminological issue. “Structural realism” is a misnomer. “Relationism” is a better name than 
“structural realism.” The term “structure” usually refers to an internal property of an object. 
For example, when I say that my body has a certain structure, I mean that my body has parts, 
and that they are organized in a certain manner. As we noted above, however, structural 
realism does not assert that an object has certain parts, and that they are organized in a certain 
manner. It rather asserts that only relations exist, or that we can know only about relations. 
Why should such a view be called “structural realism” as opposed to “relationism”? 
“Structural realism” is a misleading name that causes confusion to those who are new to 
structural realism, but it has been used so widely in the literature for so long that I am stuck 
with it. 
Structural realists might retort that according to structural realism, a structure is a 
network of relations, networks of relations are all that exists, and that there are no objects and 
no intrinsic properties. My response to this possible retort is to invite structural realists to 
consider atomism, according to which a diamond and coal are different objects because they 
form different networks of atoms. We call this view “atomism,” but not “structural realism,” 
because it asserts that atoms are the ultimate reality. By parity of reason, we should call 
“relationism” the view that relations are the ultimate reality.  
Ontic structural realism is an incoherent position. It claims that relations are all that 
exist. A disconcerting question arises. Can we say that ontic structural realism is true? In 
epistemology, truth is a relation that a belief bears to the world. If all that exists are relations, 
as ontic structural realism claims, we can say truths, a kind of relations, exist, but we cannot 
say that bearers of truths, including ontic structural realism, do not exist. However, it is a 
contradiction to say that ontic structural realism is true and it does not exist. To put 
differently, to say that ontic structural realism is true is to admit that there is an object that 
bears the relational property of being true, viz., ontic structural realism, which implies that 
ontic structural realism is false. In sum, if it is true, it is false. 
Epistemic structural realism is also an incoherent position. It claims that objects exist, 
but we cannot know about them, and we can only know about relations. It implies that 
bearers of truths exist, but we cannot know about them, which in turn implies that we can 
know that something is true, but we cannot know whether that thing is epistemic structural 
realism. To put differently, to say that we know that epistemic structural realism is true is to 
admit that there is an object about which we can know, viz., epistemic structural realism. In 
sum, if it is true, it is false. Therefore, it is just as self-defeating as ontic structural realism. 
However, I set aside the self-defeating nature of ontic structural realism and epistemic 
structural realism. I grant that they are conceptually sound views, and then explore whether 




4. Quantum Entanglement 
4.1. Two Quantum Particles 
This section explicates the concept of quantum entanglement in a non-technical manner. An 
intuitive understanding of this concept is good enough for the purpose of this paper. Let me 
begin with an everyday example. A light bulb is turned either on or off. It cannot be both on 
and off at the same time. As this example illustrates, a macroscopic object cannot have two 
incompatible properties at the same time. Quantum mechanics1 tells us, however, that a 
subatomic particle can probabilistically have two incompatible properties at the same time. 
For example, an electron is in the superposition of spin-up and spin-down in a certain 
direction at the same time, i.e., the electron has these two properties indeterminately at the 
same time. It is 50% probable that it has the property of spin-up, and also 50% probable that 
it has the property of spin-down in a certain direction. When we measure its spin property, 
however, it definitely comes to have the property of either spin-up or spin-down. That is, it 
acquires the property of either spin-up or spin-down with 100% probability. When we do not 
measure the spin property, however, it has neither the definite property of spin-up nor the 
definite property of spin-down. It has both the property of spin-up with 50% probability and 
the property of spin-down with 50% probability. We cannot even visualize such a state of 
affairs. 
When quantum mechanics says that an electron has the property of spin-up with 50% 
probability, the probability is not a subjective one but rather an objective one. A subjective 
probability represents the amount of evidence for a belief, whereas an objective probability 
represents the way the world is. The statement that an electron has the property of spin-up 
with 50% probability is intended not to reflect the amount of the evidence for the belief that 
the electron determinately has the property of spin-up but rather to reflect the state of affairs 
that the electron probabilistically has the property of spin-up. Again, we cannot even form the 
image of such a state of affairs. 
When two electrons, e1 and e2, are entangled with each other, the spin property of e1 
determines the spin property of e2, and vice versa. If we measure the spin property of e1 or e2, 
both e1 and e2 come to have definite spin properties simultaneously. If we find e1 to have the 
definite property of spin-up, e2 comes to have the definite property of spin-down. If we find 
e2 to have the definite property of spin-up, e1 comes to have the definite property of spin-
down. They come to have the definite spin properties simultaneously. The distance between 
them does not matter. Even if e1 is on the Earth and e2 is in the Andromeda Galaxy, the 
measurement of the spin property of e1 instantaneously makes e2 have the definite opposite 
spin property, and vice versa. Albert Einstein called this phenomenon “spooky action at a 
distance.” 
 
4.2. Relational Properties? 
Quantum entanglement poses a challenge to the traditional metaphysical view that extrinsic 
properties are determined by intrinsic properties of an object. Alyssa Ney constructs the 
challenge, without endorsing it, as follows: 
 
When two particles are in the singlet state, neither can individually be said to have a determinate 
x-spin. So even if spin properties like x-spin up or x-spin down are intrinsic, they are not the sort 
of properties that particles in states like the singlet state possess. It is rather only the case (given 
the ontological completeness of the quantum state) for particle 1 that it has the extrinsic property 
 
1 This paper operates under von Neumann and Dirac’s version of quantum mechanics. It requires separate 
papers to explore how structural realism fares under Bohemian mechanics and under the many-worlds 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
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of having the opposite x-spin of particle 2, and for particle 2 that it has the extrinsic property of 
having the opposite x-spin of particle 1. At best, the spin properties attributed to particles by 
virtue of their entering into entangled state are extrinsic spin properties. (Ney, 2010, p. 227) 
 
The idea is that e1 has the property of spin-up with 50% probability in virtue of e2’s having 
the property of spin-down with 50% probability, and vice versa. Thus, the spin property of e1 
is determined not by an intrinsic property of e1 but rather by the spin property of e2; the spin 
property of e2 is determined not by an intrinsic property of e2 but rather by the spin property 
of e1. In other words, e1 has the spin property not in virtue of the way it is but rather in virtue 
of the way it relates to e2, and e2 also has the spin property not in virtue of the way it is but 
rather in virtue of the way it relates to e1. It follows that the spin properties of both e1 and e2 
are not intrinsic properties but rather relational properties. 
What are we to make of this argument? It is built upon the metaphysical view that e1 
and e2 are two different objects. There is, however, an alternative metaphysical view: e1 and 
e2 constitute a single object, i.e., e1 and e2 are different parts of the same system. Of course, e1 
and e2 are spatially separated, so they appear to be separate objects. We can, however, view 
them as different parts of the same system. Consider, for example, that my heart and liver are 
spatially separated, but are different parts of the same object, viz., my body. Thus, spatial 
separation should not pose any problem for the view that e1 and e2 constitute a single system. 
Under this alternative view, the spin properties of e1 and e2 are intrinsic properties of the 
system because they are not properties the system has in virtue of the way it relates to another 
system but rather properties the system has in virtue of the way it is.  
Structural realists might argue that the spin properties of e1 and e2 are not intrinsic 
properties of the system but rather a structure of the world. In my view, however, this 
proposal clashes with structural realism, for it implies that the spin properties of e1 and e2 are 
intrinsic properties of the world. The spin properties cannot be extrinsic properties of the 
world because the world cannot bear a relation to anything else. If the world can have 
intrinsic properties, objects in the world can also have intrinsic properties. We have no reason 
to think that the world can have intrinsic properties, but that its parts cannot. Thus, saying 
that the spin properties are a structure of the world opens the door to the traditional 
metaphysical view that objects and intrinsic properties are distinct from extrinsic properties. 
Structural realists might object that neither e1 nor e2 has a determinate spin property, so 
the system as a whole does not have a determinate property, and hence it does not have an 
intrinsic property. In my view, however, it is a mistake to think that the entanglement of the 
system is an indeterminate property. It is either 100% probable or 0% probable that e1 and e2 
are entangled with each other, i.e., they are either definitely in an entangled state or they are 
not. There is no third state which the system can be in. It is not the case that e1 and e2 are 
entangled with each other with 50% objective probability, and that they are not entangled 
with each other with 50% objective probability. It is not the system but rather the parts 
thereof that are in objective probabilistic states. Moreover, the entanglement of e1 and e2 is 
not a relational property but rather an intrinsic property of the system, for e1 and e2 are in an 
entangled state not in virtue of the relation they bear to other electrons but rather in virtue of 
the way they are. 
This discussion shows that once we classify two entangled particles as an object or a 
system, quantum entanglement undermines rather than supports ontic structural realism. How 
about epistemic structural realism? Entanglement also undermines it. We can know that two 
quantum particles are entangled with each other, and that as I argued above, the spin 
properties of e1 and e2 are intrinsic properties of the system. Thus, we can have knowledge 
about the intrinsic properties of the system.  
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Let me offer another example of an intrinsic property of a quantum system that we can 
have knowledge about. Suppose we have two quantum systems: S1 and S2. S1 consists of e1 
and e2 which are entangled with each other. S2 consists of e3 and e4 which are also entangled 
with each other. Both e1 and e3 are on the Earth, e2 is on Mars, and e4 is on Neptune. The two 
parts of S1 are spatially less separated from each other than the two parts of S2. Let me call 
“the entance” the distance between the entangled particles. “Entance” is a portmanteau of 
“entanglement” and “distance.” So S1 and S2 have different entances, and the entance of S1 is 
shorter than the entance of S2. An interesting question arises. Is entance an intrinsic property 
or a relational property of a quantum system? Of course, it is an intrinsic property. The 
entance of S1 is a property which S1 has by virtue of the way it is. It is not a property which 
S1 has by virtue of the relation it bears to S2 or any other system. The existence of the entance 
is a strike against ontic structural realism, according to which a quantum system does not 
have any irreducible intrinsic property. In addition, we can know about the entance of S1 and 
of S2. We can know how far e1 and e2 are separated from each other, and how far e3 and e4 
are separated from each other. Our knowledge about the entances is a strike against epistemic 
structural realism, according to which we cannot know about an irreducible intrinsic property 
of a quantum system. In sum, the existence of entances and our knowledge about them 
undermine both ontic structural realism and epistemic structural realism. 
My foregoing criticisms against structural realism rely on my classification system 
according to which two entangled electrons constitute a single system. How would critics 
respond to my classification system? They might object that I offered no justification for it, 
and it competes with the traditional classification system according to which two entangled 
electrons are two objects. Why is my classification system preferable to the traditional 
classification system? 
This objection is reasonable. Let me point out, however, that no justification is offered 
for the traditional classification system either. In general, there can be no epistemic 
justification for a classification system, and there can only be a pragmatic justification for it. 
After all, a classification system is not the kind of thing that can be true or false. It can only 
be useful or useless. Therefore, my classification system cannot be proved to be false. 
 
4.3. Supervenience 
A tennis ball is spherical and similar to a baseball with respect to shape. The similarity, an 
extrinsic property of the tennis ball, is determined by the sphericity, an intrinsic property of 
the tennis ball. Is the spin property of an electron determined by an intrinsic property of the 
electron, as the similarity of the tennis ball is determined by the sphericity of the tennis ball? 
The concept of quantum entanglement implies that the spin property of e1 is determined not 
by an intrinsic property of e1 but rather by the spin property of e2, and that the spin property 
of e2 is determined not by an intrinsic property of e2 but rather by the spin property of e1. 
Utilizing the peculiarity of quantum entanglement, structural realists might suggest that 
“in the entangled states of quantum mechanics relations do not supervene on the properties of 
particles” (Alai, 2017, p. 32). The idea seems to be that the spin property of e1 supervenes not 
on an intrinsic property of e1 but rather on the spin property of e2; the spin property of e2 
supervenes not on an intrinsic property of e2 but rather on the spin property of e1. So quantum 
entanglement undermines the traditional metaphysical view that an intrinsic property is 
ontologically prior to an extrinsic property, and it supports the structuralist view that a 
relational property is not derivative of an intrinsic property. This section attacks both the 
premise and the form of this argument. 
To understand the premise of the argument, we first need to be clear about the concept 
of supervenience. Simply put, “[w]e have supervenience when there could be no difference of 
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one sort without differences of another sort” (Lewis, 1986, p. 14). Suppose that there are two 
properties: A and B. To say that A supervenes on B means that there can be no difference in 
A without a difference in B, and that sameness in B implies sameness in A. Thus, B 
determines A, but not vice versa. For example, to say that pain supervenes on C-fiber firing 
means that if you feel pain, but I do not, then it must be that you have C-fiber firing, but I do 
not. It is impossible that both you and I have C-fiber firing. Also, if you and I both have C-
fiber firing, then we must both feel pain. It is impossible that you feel pain, but I do not, and 
vice versa. In short, to say that pain supervenes on C-fiber firing means that C-fiber firing 
determines pain, but not vice versa. Even if someone feels pain, he might not have C-fiber 
firing, i.e., it is open whether he has C-fiber firing or not. Imagine that a Martian has a brain 
made out of silicon as opposed to carbon, so he has not C-fiber firing but rather S-fiber firing. 
Yet, he can feel pain when his body is damaged. Thus, pain can obtain while C-fiber firing 
does not, and pain does not determine C-fiber firing. Still, pain supervenes on C-fiber firing. 
     The concept of supervenience needs to be distinguished from the concept of reduction. 
As we have seen before, to say that A is reducible to B means that on close examination, A 
turns out to be B, and that A and B are numerically identical with each other, so where there 
is A, there must be B, and vice versa. For example, Peter Parker is reducible to Spiderman, so 
where there is Spiderman, so must be Peter Parker, and vice versa. It is impossible that Peter 
Parker exists, but Spiderman does not, and vice versa. By contrast, to say that A supervenes 
on B implies that although B determines A, A does not determine B. So where there is B, 
there must be A, but not vice versa. It follows that A and B are distinct from each other. For 
example, to say that pain supervenes on C-fiber firing implies that where there is pain, there 
might not be C-fiber firing, so pain and C-fiber firing are distinct from each other. Keep in 
mind that A supervenes on B implies that A and B are distinct from each other. 
What does it mean to say that the spin property of an electron supervenes on its 
intrinsic property? It means that if two electrons have qualitatively identical intrinsic 
properties, and if one electron has the property of spin-up, then the other electron must also 
have the property of spin-up. In other words, the intrinsic property determines the spin 
property, i.e., where there is the intrinsic property, there must also be the spin property. It also 
means that even if two electrons have the same spin property, they might have different 
intrinsic properties. In other words, the spin property does not determine the intrinsic 
property, i.e., where there is the spin property, there might not be the intrinsic property. Keep 
in mind that if the spin property supervenes on the intrinsic property, the spin property and 
the intrinsic property are different properties. 
What does it mean to say that the spin property of an electron does not supervene on its 
intrinsic property? It means that the spin property does not determine the intrinsic property, 
and vice versa. Thus, the spin property can exist while the intrinsic property does not, and 
vice versa. Also, even if two electrons have qualitatively identical intrinsic properties, they 
may have different spin properties, and even if they have qualitatively identical spin 
properties, they may have different intrinsic properties. Thus, spin properties and the intrinsic 
properties are distinct properties, and they have no interesting correlation. This interpretation 
of non-supervenience goes well with the interpretation that to say that pain does not 
supervene on C-fiber firing means that pain and C-fiber firing are distinct properties, and that 
they have no interesting correlation. 
     As you may have already noticed, it does not matter whether the spin property of an 
electron supervenes on an intrinsic property of the electron. The spin property and the 
intrinsic property are different properties. The position that the spin property supervenes on 
the intrinsic properties of the electron implies that they are different properties. So does the 
position that the spin property does not supervene on the intrinsic property. The only 
8 
 
difference between the two positions is that the former position implies that the intrinsic 
property determines the spin property, whereas the latter position does not. 
     The implication that the spin property and the intrinsic property are different properties 
clashes with both ontic and epistemic structural realism. To say that they are different 
properties presupposes that the intrinsic property exists, and that it is not reducible to an 
extrinsic property. This presupposition clashes with ontic structural realism that there are no 
intrinsic properties. In addition, to say that the spin property and the intrinsic property are 
different properties implies that we know at least one thing about the intrinsic property, viz., 
it is different from the spin property. This corollary clashes with epistemic structural realism 
that we cannot know anything about the intrinsic properties of unobservable objects. 
Can structural realists contend that the spin property of e1 supervenes on the spin 
property of e2? The answer at first appears to be “Yes,” given that the spin property of e2 
determines the spin property of e1. On close examination, however, the answer is “No” 
because to say “Yes” implies that the spin property of e1 does not determine the spin property 
of e2. Recall that to say that A supervenes on B implies that A does not determine B. This 
implication runs counter to the idea that if e1 is entangled with e2, the spin property of e1 
determines the spin property of e2. Consequently, it is wrong to say that the spin property of 
e1 supervenes on the spin property of e2. 
     Can structural realists say that the spin property of e1 supervenes on the spin property 
of e2, and that the spin property of e2 supervenes on the spin property of e1? Two 
contradictions are involved in saying “Yes.” To say that the spin property of e1 supervenes on 
the spin property of e2 implies that the spin property of e2 determines the spin property of e1, 
but that the spin property of e1 does not determine the spin property of e1. To say that the spin 
property of e2 supervenes on the spin property of e1 implies that the spin property of e1 
determines the spin property of e2, but that the spin property of e2 does not determine the spin 
property of e1. It is a contradiction to say that the spin property of e2 determines the spin 
property of e1, and that the spin property of e2 does not determine the spin property of e1. It is 
also a contradiction to say that the spin property of e1 does not determine the spin property of 
e1 and the spin property of e1 determines the spin property of e2. 
So far in this section, I have criticized the premise of the possible structural realists’ 
argument. Let me now turn to the relation between the premise and the conclusion. It is a 
fallacious argument that since a spin property of an electron does not supervene on the 
intrinsic properties of electrons, an intrinsic property does not exist. Imagine that a 
philosopher of mind contends that since pain does not supervene on C-fiber firing, C-fiber 
firing does not exist. Such an argument would fly in the face of philosophers of mind. 
Unfortunately, there is no structural difference between the structural realists’ argument and 
the counterintuitive argument made. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The spin property of e1 is determined not by its intrinsic property but rather by the spin 
property of e2. So structural realists might cite quantum entanglement as evidence for 
structural realism. I argued, however, that once we view two entangled electrons as 
constituting a single system, the entanglement of the two electrons undermines rather than 
supports structural realism. Ontic structural realism is undermined by the suggestion that the 
spin properties are intrinsic properties of the system. Epistemic structural realism is 
undermined by the suggestion that we know that two electrons are entangled with each other, 
and that they are spatially separated from each other.  
Structural realists might contend that the spin property of a quantum particle does not 
supervene on an intrinsic property of the quantum particle. I argued that their contention 
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destroys structural realism, for it presupposes both that extrinsic and intrinsic properties are 
distinct properties, and that we can have knowledge about intrinsic properties. Moreover, it is 
an objectionable inference that since the spin property of an electron does not supervene on 
an intrinsic property of the electron, the intrinsic property does not exist. The concept of 
supervenience neither illuminates quantum entanglement nor helps structural realism.  
To sum up, although quantum entanglement poses a challenge to the traditional 
metaphysical view that an extrinsic property is determined by an intrinsic property of an 
object, it supports neither ontic structural realism that all that exists are relational properties 
nor epistemic structural realism that we cannot know about the intrinsic property of quantum 
particles. As I said earlier, however, there are other versions of structural realism. Also, there 
are other arguments for and against structural realism. They should be addressed in separate 
papers. This paper only concerns the issue of whether quantum entanglement supports ontic 
structural realism and epistemic structural realism. 
 
References 
Alai, M. (2017). The debates on scientific realism today: Knowledge and objectivity in 
science. In E. Agazzi (Ed.), Varieties of scientific realism: Objectivity and truth in science. 
(pp. 19–47). Cham: Springer. 
 
Busch, J. (2003). What structures could not be. International Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science, 17(3), 211–225. 
 
Cao, T. (2003). Between platonism and phenomenalism: Reply to Cao. Synthese, 136(1), 73–
78. 
 
Churchland, P. (1981). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of 
Philosophy, 78(2), 67–90. 
 
Frigg, R. and I. Votsis (2011). Everything you always wanted to know about structural 
realism but were afraid to ask. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 1(2), 227–276. 
 
Ladyman, J. (2014). Structural realism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/structural-realism/>. 
 
Ladyman, J. and D. Ross, D. Spurrett, and J. Collier (2007). Every thing must go: 
Metaphysics naturalised. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Lewis, D. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing. 
 
Morganti, M. (2004). On the preferability of epistemic structural realism. Synthese 142(1), 
81–107. 
 
Ney, A. (2010). Are there fundamental intrinsic properties? In A. Hazelett (Ed.), New waves 
in physics. (pp. 219–239). New York: Palgrave Macmillan:. 
 





Psillos, S. (2006). The structure, the whole structure and nothing but the structure? 
Philosophy of Science 73(5), 560–570. 
 
Saunders, S. (2003). Structural realism again. Synthese, 136(1), 127–133. 
 
Stein, H. (1989). Yes, but… some skeptical remarks on realism and antirealism. Dialectica 
43(1), 47–65. 
